The political crisis in Spain

Now that the 1992 Europe euphoria has died down, Spain is going through a very tough political, social and economic crisis. The two most likely scenarios seem to be: coming out of the tunnel in the near future or an Italian-style implosion of the whole system.

In June 1993 Felipe González won a surprise election victory and obtained his fourth consecutive mandate. Although they lost the outright majority they had enjoyed since 1982, the Socialists (Psoe) had a clear relative majority over José María Aznar’s Popular Party (Pp).Thanks to outside backing from the moderate Catalan and Basque nationalists, Felipe (as the socialist leader is generally called in Spain) was able to form a single party government, thus avoiding untenable alliances to the left with Izquierda Unida (lu), the United Left coalition led by the not very forward-looking Julio Anguita.

The victory was won despite the continuing slump of the post-1992 economic crisis and dramatically high levels of unemployment – the great Achilles’ heel ofthe Spanish economy.

During the electoral campaign Aznar’s nueva derecha (new right) gained in credibility and the Popular Party seemed poised to represent a plausible centreright for the first time in a country still with many skeletons in the cupboard from forty years of Franco.

Moreover, the Psoe seemed to be worn out by its long spell in government eleven years as sole party in power. The unexpected victory is probably not so much due to the party’s efforts but the highly charismatic figure of Felipe González. Ultimately many sceptical voters gave him one last chance, pushing up the presence at the polls considerably. Many electors who would not normally vote for the disappointing Socialists and never for the Popular Party, gave up their normal tactic of abstention to avoid the danger of a return to power of the right.

On his victory night González showed he understood the electors’ message and promised a change in the change»: an opening up of the Psoe to the rest of society and a commitment to tackling the economic crisis.

But what has happened since then? González has led an attempt to renew the party. The main victims were supposed to have been the followers of his former second-in-command, Alfonso Guerra, a key figure in the party. Although the renewers came to the 23rd Federal Congress in March with a clear majority, González failed to win back the whole party.The composition of the new ruling executive is the outcome of a compromise with the Guerra element in the party – the expression of an old-world socialism, unpopular with public opinion but with a strong electoral power base in the autonomous communities, the traditional Psoe heartlands (Andalusia and Extremadura).

Public opinion thus viewed the outcome ofthe Congress basically as a betrayal of Felipe’s electoral promises.

On the front of the economic crisis, over the last year the government has totally failed to respond in any effective way. The unpopular Finance Minister, Carlos Solchaga, was sacrificed on the altar of better public relations with society, but his replacement Pedro Solbes did not
bring an injection of much-needed new confidence into the ailing Spanish economy.

In fact the problems besetting the Spаnish economy are systemic and not simply due to the recession. They are mainly connected to the inflexible nature of the economic system itself.

But just how far can a party in power for twelve years blame conditions which it helped to generate? High unemployment payments and the considerable redundancy burdens for firms prior to the recent reform of the labour market were clear signs of a left-wing bias in the legislation for labour rights. This tendency was fully justifiable for a socialist party in the early 1980s and played an important role in eliminating the paternalism of the Franco period, but it is at odds with the economic realities of the 1990s.

The problem is that González fails to convince as a prophet of neoliberal economic recipes. Increasingly the Spanish are reasoning along the following lines: would it not be more logical if the moderate right and not the centre-left played the role of right-wing government? The Psoe was the leading player in the modernization of Spain and its full membership of the European Community. But can the same old political establishment usher in a new political phase?

In addition to the dramatic problem of unemployment (24 per cent!), there are a number of other key controversial issues: for example, the insistence on keeping the peseta in the European Monetary System means the country can’t enjoy export benefits, which prove so vital to the Italians, and has led to huge monetary reserves being consumed.

But what has alarmed people most has been the government’s ineffectiveness and lack of initiative. And to these must be added the wave of recent scandals that has seriously threatened the González government.

On this subject it must be pointed out that corruption is not endemic in Spain.
It is not a «system». The relatively efficient public administration has never been involved in large scandals in the recent years of democracy. This is why the latest wave of revelations concerning the illegal activities of the governor of the Banco de España, Mariano Rubio, and the director general of the Guardia Civil, Luis Roldán has aroused such an unprecedented popular outcry in the country.

In addition to scandals in public institutions came the clamorous collapse of one of the myths of the private sector: the president of the Banco Español de Crédito, Mario Conde. Parading behind the mask of leading media person, he simply turned out to be a disastrous banker.

Other traditionally more solid institutions in the country (Banco de España, Guardia Civil, Banesto, etc.) were used by unscrupulous speculators to get rich quick, abetted by complicity at the highest level and the climate of frenetic speculation in the late 1980s.

González is seen as bearing the main political responsibility for this situation and, although he has a mandate until 1997, it is unlikely he will last the full term of office.

But what are the alternatives?

The only other party capable of taking power is Aznar’s Popular Party: the youthful leader has reorganized the party, modernizing it and adapting it to the needs of a country which for years has been in search of an unambiguous democratic representative for the centre-right.

Significantly, the Popular Party has rid itself of the rather awkward presence of its founder, Manuel Fraga Iribarne, who has been sidelined to his native Galicia, where he rules over the regional government in the style of a head of state.

Aznar’s youthful assistants are welleducated and not tainted by links with the Francoist past. But will this be enough to send the Psoe to the opposition? The answer is probably yes, but the lessons from the last general elections must not be ignored.

As long as the Popular Party fails to overcome its weak standing in three key communities – Andalusia (where the Psoe can still count on enormous electoral support), Catalonia and the Basque Country (where the moderate electors have been won over to the nationalists Convercia i Unio and the Partido Nacionalista Vasco) it will be extremely difficult to obtain a majority in the Cortes.

Aznar has placed his trust in the newcomer Javier Arenas in Andalusia, by appointing him head ofthe local party. It will be interesting to see how he fares in the local elections in Andalusia and whether the Popular Party can make significant inroads into the Psoe majority.

In Catalonia and the Basque Country, the majority parties’ decision to continue supporting the Socialist government has embarrassed the Popular Party, since it can hardly claim to be very responsive to the nationalist issues which are so important in these two autonomous communities.

The backing from Convercia and the Basque Nationalist Party for central government is yielding important dividends for the autonomous communities in general (for example, the Administration has granted them five per cent of income tax) and for Catalonia and the Basque Country in particular: the Popиlar Party thus lacks a specific role in the se communities since it is unlikely that the centre-right electorate will abandon the moderate nationalist parties, and the centre-left voters are unlikely to be won over by the Popular Party, because of ideological but also regionalist prejudices.

This complex situation is thwarting the rise of the Popular Party, which has been very impressive in the rest of the country. There are no other likely scenarios: the United Left has an upper limit of votes, while other centre options have evaporated (for example, Suarez’s Centro democratico y social).

The Spanish political system has thus effectively become bipolar. But even given this bipolarity it is still unclear whether there can be a true alternating of power.

The Psoe has played a fundamental role in the history of Spain: the exemplary transition process could not have been completed without their presence in the government. But the problem for the party today is its lack of energy and the fact it has been exhausted: the social climate in Spain in the 1980s was full of enthusiasm and the innovative optimism whipped up by a generation of fortyyear-olds who had taken the reins of the country in hand, revealing its great potential and leaving behind the decades of near total isolation.

Today we can’t help but smile on seeing the corduroy jackets and checked shirts worn by the Psoe leaders in the early 1980s. Now it is strictly grey suits. Nonetheless, the Socialist did leave a fundamental indelible mark on Spain: they were the best option possible for the country over the last ten years.

But is this enough to keep them in power for much longer? Felipe González is fond of saying that he needs twenty-five years to completely transform the country. Which means we are only at the half-way stage.

Apart from their loss in credibility over the last year, the Socialists main problem in recent times has been the total absence of an alternative to González for the leadership: all the opinion polls suggest there would be a drastic drop in Psoe votes if the current prime minister stepped down. If González were to go it would be a sure step towards electoral defeat.

In fact it would not be in the Popular Party’s interest to win possible early elections at present. Aware of this, the party strategists cry scandal but are taking their time before reaping the logical consequences of such moves.

The situation in Spain is basically stalemate: the Psoe may lose the elections, but González still has an important personal capital to fall back on. Yet to exploit it, he is condemned to be the eternal party leader.

The litmus test for judging González’s policies in the rest ofhis term of office will be his efforts against corruption and his ability to free his party from the clouds of scandal. The Popular Party seems destined to grow, but only within the limits imposed by the regional factors mentioned above, which cuts it off from a vital number of votes.

This stalemate would not seem to presage an Italian-style collapse, since the foundations of the system are still intact. It is only a difficult stage in the transition process to democracy, which will only be truly complete when an alternating two-party system is really established.

It comes as a surprise to hear Aznar, the leader of the Spanish right, claiming he is the heir to Manuel Azaña, the greatly venerated president of the Second Spanish Republic defeated in the civil war. Aznar needs to convince the public opinion he is a reliable leader capable of
being inspired by the teachings of great progressive figures (although not from the left) of the past, so as to sway those three million voters who would tip the balance.

Paradoxically, González used the same tactic in 1982. He evoked the figure of Azaña to persuade the centre to give the left a chance.

Thus after almost sixty years President Azaña is unexpectedly once more centre stage in Spanish politics. Which just goes to show that at times History grants revenge to those defeated in their own lifetime.